

















In 2008, an opposition coalition defeated the Paraguayan Colorado
Party, which had been in power for 61 years, including 35 years of the
longest dictatorship in South America. Using data of all the public
procurement transactions from 2004 through 2011 and the political
connections of the 700 largest public providers, this paper documents
how the volume of contracts received by connected firms evolved after
this landmark political change. It shows that firms connected with
the first ring of power were punished and that there were efficiency
gains, mostly in the form of institutions shifting to bigger and more
competitive contracts, but that these gains were constrained by the
scarcity of entrepreneurs able to step in to replace firms connected to
the previous regime. This demonstrates that the potential economic
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benefits of democratization are hampered by the perverse rent-seeking
entrepreneurial incentives created by a long-term single-party author-
itarian regime.
Keywords: Procurement, Political Connections, Rent-seeking, De-
mocratization, Authoritarian regimes.
JEL codes: H57, D72, O5
1 Introduction
In April 2008, the Paraguayan Associación Nacional Republicana (ANR),
locally known as the Colorado Party, was defeated in the presidential elec-
tion by a coalition of opposition parties and social organizations led by a
former Catholic bishop, Fernando Lugo. This was a dramatic and largely
unanticipated change in a country in which the Colorado Party had enjoyed
a monopoly in political power for 61 years, including the 35 years of the
Stroessner dictatorship (1954-1989) and the 19 years elapsed since the 1989
coup. For six decades, the Colorado Party had systematically channeled pub-
lic resources to a subset of citizens by distributing public employment and
procurement contracts to the benefit of party members and supporters of the
regime. This formed the basis of the Paraguayan “rent-seeking economy.”
As in other countries where the rule of a single party lasts for such a
long time, including non-democratic spells,1 the incoming government faced
challenges of a different nature and magnitude than those of countries accus-
tomed to regular democratic shifts in power. The distortions in the structure
of incentives, the weight of political patronage and corruption in all aspects
of economic life, and the institutional shortcomings that characterized the
regime were so profound that it was obvious from the start that transforming
the Paraguayan economy, one of the least developed in Latin America, would
1Examples include the Mexican PRI, which lost the 2000 presidential election after
more than seven decades in power, Taiwan, Zambia, and several communist regimes that
survived the Soviet Union (see Haggard and Kaufman, 1995, Chap. 8).
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be a daunting task.
This paper documents a specific aspect of this transition, namely, the
changes in the relevance of political connections for the allocation of public
funds through procurement spending, and analyzes the impact on the effi-
ciency of public procurement spending after democratization using a unique
dataset that tracks nearly all public procurement contracts in the country,
representing around 10% of the country’s annual gross domestic product
(GDP), from 2004 to 2011.
Specifically, it looks first at the consequences of the political change with
regard to the volume of public contracts received by firms with different po-
litical ties, showing that those connected to the previous regime were "pun-
ished," especially firms belonging to former influential Colorado ‘core’ mem-
bers connected to the top levels of government. Conversely, firms connected
to the main party of the opposition coalition benefited in the initial period
of the new government but, overall, non-connected firms were the main ben-
eficiaries of the losses incurred by connected entrepreneurs.
Second, it delves into the channels behind these results, showing first
that they were not driven by a reduction in contracts distributed through
exception or competition-suppressing mechanisms. Instead, losses to firms
linked to the previous regime appear to be specifically the result of a reduc-
tion in the portfolios of Colorado entrepreneurs in both the biggest and the
fastest growing product categories. These categories accommodated more
non-connected entrepreneurs prior to 2008, who were then able to step in
and grab a bigger share of public contracts after the change.
Finally, this evolution appears to have been efficiency-enhancing in the
sense that public institutions that reduced their share of political contract-
ing more dramatically did so by using bigger contracts and more competitive
procedures. This implies a reduction in the number of active suppliers and
a shift toward open tendering procedures, as well as a decrease in the share
of providers boasting previous credit or payment incidents. However, the
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evidence also indicates that such benefits only materialized for product cat-
egories where a sufficiently large number of potential independent entrepre-
neurs already existed to respond to public demand, showing the limitations
generated by the decade-long stronghold on the economy by the outgoing Col-
orado Party. These results demonstrate that the potential economic benefits
from democratization in the context of a long-term single-party authoritarian
regime are constrained by the long-lasting perverse entrepreneurial incentives
and rent-seeking ties that supported it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 situates the
contribution of this paper within several strands of related literature. Section
3 describes the Paraguayan political and economic process under the previous
regime and the main changes brought about by the 2008 election. Section 4
introduces the procurement and related data used and presents descriptive
statistics, section 5 presents the econometric analysis and discusses basic
results, section 6 delves into the efficiency effects, and section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper relates first to the literature on political connections of firms.
Most of this literature has relied on establishing a causal link between some
measure of connection, usually family ties, friendship, party membership, or
campaign contribution, and the stock market valuation of large firms. Re-
searchers who have found a positive effect of connections on firms’ valuations
include Fisman (2001), who tracked changes in the stock market value of In-
donesian firms depending on the strength of their connections to the Suharto
network, Roberts (1990), who exploited the natural experiment resulting
from a US senator’s sudden death, Ferguson and Voth (2008) on the value of
connections between the German industry and the Nazi party, Jayachandran
(2006) on the "Jeffords effect," named after the consequences of Senator Jim
Jeffords leaving the Republican Party and tipping control of the US Senate
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to the Democrats in 2001, on the stock market valuation of Democrat-related
firms, and Coulomb and Sangnier (2012) on the impact of Sarkozy’s election
on related French firms, among others.2 Faccio (2006) presented consistent
cross-country evidence and stated in particular that connections are more
prevalent in corrupt countries and in those with less transparent political
systems.3
Several researchers have examined the channels of this value creation by
looking at specific economic inputs that firms secure through their political
ties, sympathies, or financial contributions. Evidence of increased access to
credit has been provided by Khwaja and Mian (2005) for Pakistan, Li, Meng,
Wang, and Zhou (2008) for China, and Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008)
for Brazil, while de Figueiredo and Edwards (2007) showed that campaign
contributions elicit higher regulated prices in the US telecommunications in-
dustry.4 Closely related to this paper is Goldman, Rochol, and So (2011),
who showed that the allocation of procurement contracts in the US shifted to-
ward firms with Republican politicians on their boards of directors following
the 1996 and 2000 elections.
This study contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, it tracks
a broad set of firms representing a large share of the domestic entrepreneur-
ship of a developing country. Indeed, the sample is unique in that it tracks
700 firms, covering 70% of the country’s public procurement spending, over
nearly a decade and relies both on an objective measure of connectedness,
namely, party membership, and a concrete outcome in the form of access to
procurement contracts. Moreover, by comparing periods before and after a
2A few researchers, including Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) and Fisman, Schulz, and
Vig (2013), have documented the opposite channel, namely, politicians’ returns to political
power.
3Fisman et al. (2012), who failed to find an impact of the connections to former US
Vice President Dick Cheney, is an exception consistent with Faccio’s (2006) finding that
the importance of political ties is conditional on the quality of institutions.
4For individual economic agents, Hsieh, Miguel, Ortega, and Rodriguez (2011) provided
evidence from Venezuela showing the earnings and employment costs of opposing Hugo
Chávez.
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major political change, the study provides evidence of the efficiency cost of
a system in which the public sector relies mostly on connections to allocate
contracts to private agents.
Second, this work relates to the political science literature analyzing long-
term single-party authoritarian regimes. Most of this literature has focused
on the mechanisms that allow such regimes to survive or lead to their even-
tual demise (e.g.,Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and
Weingast, 2003; Magaloni, 2006 and 2010). While the impact of this dynamic
process on the economic performance of such regimes and their ability to
make important reforms is somewhat understood (see, for example, Haggard
and Kaufman, 1995, Chap. 8, and Przeworski et al., 2000), little is known
about the consequences for the performance of the regimes after an abrupt
electoral change. The paper’s contribution is to illustrate both the potential
economic benefits when democratization calls into question the rent-seeking
ties that were at the root of such regimes and the economic costs stemming
from the long-lasting perverse entrepreneurial incentives that derive from an
economic organization based on political connections.
This paper also pertains to a small body of literature analyzing polit-
ical favoritism and corruption in the procurement process. A few notable
contributions include Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), Hyytinen, Lund-
berg, and Toinaven (2007), Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti (2009), Auriol et al.
(2011), and Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2012). The paper contributes by doc-
umenting both wrongdoings in public purchases and the link between major
political changes and improvement in procurement practices in the case of a
developing country that is characterized by weak overall institutional quality.
Finally, the paper adds to an incipient multidisciplinary body of work
on the characteristics and long-term effects of the Paraguayan Colorado
regime, which started with and then prolonged the Stroessner dictatorship,
the longest right-wing dictatorship in Latin America (e.g., Nickson and Lam-
bert, 1997; Richards, 2008; Folch, 2013). While these papers emphasized sev-
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eral channels for rent-seeking and harvesting, including the distribution of
public jobs, public lands, and tolerance of illegal activities such as smuggling,
this study is the first to document in detail the systematic use of the public
procurement process, and not only for mega-projects such as hydroelectric
dams, to sustain the regime’s network of followers.
3 Paraguay’s Political Environment
The Country
Paraguay is a landlocked country of 6.5 million inhabitants in the middle
of South America, neighbor to Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia. As of 2010, it
was a low-middle-income country with a per capita income of US $2,7105 and
a poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line of 35%. Its population
is predominantly urban (61%) and young (28.5% under 15, with a median age
of 25 years), and economic production concentrates in (intensive) agriculture,
the three main products being soybeans, cotton, and meat, and in services
such as commerce and finance, including a large informal sector.
The Dictatorship (1954-1989)
During the second half of the twentieth century, Paraguay suffered under
one of the harshest dictatorships in Latin America. General Alfredo Stroess-
ner grabbed power in May 1954 through a military coup against Federico
Chávez, of his own party, and was named president by a military board. He
was subsequently reelected president eight times in fraudulent elections.
Stroessner rapidly installed a grueling system of oppression, which sys-
tematically spied on, detained, and tortured opponents.6 Thousands were
physically eliminated and at least tens of thousands went into exile.7
5GNI in current US$, Atlas method, as reported by the World Bank world development
indicators.
6See the fascinating account of the surveillance and repression techniques "Es mi in-
forme" (Boccia Paz, González, and Palau, 1994) based on archives from the dictatorship
and Folch (2013), who offered a detailed view of state violence during the dictatorship.
7See Informe Final, Comision de Verdad y Justicia (CVJ), Tomo I, 2008, available
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This iron rule was complemented by a well-organized system that com-
bined looting the country’s resources for the private benefit of a few and
redistributing some of the proceeds to a large enough network of followers to
ensure the stability of the regime. Evidence of this looting and redistribution
remains in the many mansions belonging to Colorado politicians or their heirs
located throughout the capital city of Asunción, among which are replicas of
Loire castles and the White House.8 The Stroessner family is estimated to
have accumulated a fortune that may amount to US $5 billion, equivalent as
of 2010 to twice the public debt and 27% of the Paraguayan GDP.9
The redistribution network, on the other hand, operated through the sys-
tematic allocation of public jobs and lucrative procurement contracts to the
members of the Colorado Party.10 During the 1970s and 1980s, the expansion
in public works, benefited a select class of entrepreneurs closely linked to the
government. Among these works was the construction of two large hydroelec-
tric power plants in Itaipú and Yacyretá, with respective construction costs
of nearly US $20 billion and $15 billion, equivalent to between three and five
times the value of the 1989 GDP. In this context, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, an
engineer who was one of the main Itaipú contractors, subsequently became
president of the country between 1993 and 1997.
In the case of Yacyretá, which former Argentine President Carlos Menem
knowingly dubbed a "monument to corruption," numerous irregularities were
confirmed by a World Bank investigation in 2004, and a cost overrun of
at least US $8 billion was estimated. Although no records of the use of
public money during that period are available, ample anecdotal evidence
exists suggesting that a few individuals grew extremely rich through the
arbitrary allocation of public contracts, the grabbing of immense extensions
online at http://www.meves.org.py/?node=page&meves=blob,631,0
8See Miranda, 2000.
9El País Internacional, 21/02/2012.
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/02/21/actualidad/1329855402_524683.html
10Nickson and Lambert, 2002; Auriol, Straub, and Flochel, 2011.
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of public land,11 or the tolerance of smuggling and other illegal activities,
including drug trafficking and money laundering.
The Democratic Transition (1989-2008)
On February 3, 1989, Alfredo Stroessner was deposed by General Andrés
Rodríguez, widely nicknamed the "cocaine" general, Stroessner’s protégé and
“compadre.”12 Rodríguez subsequently organized open elections in which he
was elected president. Four other Colorado presidents succeeded him, until
the 2008 election removed the party from executive power.13
In the first few years, numerous reforms were made, including the elim-
ination of multiple exchange rates, financial liberalization, and the signing
of the Mercosur Treaty with neighboring countries (Straub, 1998). However,
these reforms failed to put the country on a higher growth trajectory, in
large part because the system of patronage and corruption inherited from
the dictatorship not only continued but became worse.14
Using procurement data for the period 2004-2007 (i.e., before the political
change), Auriol, Straub, and Flochel (2011) showed that corruption in the
procurement process resulted in a severe misallocation of talents, jeopardizing
entrepreneurial incentives, à la Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991).
Their findings were twofold. First, there exists a group of private firms that
live mostly off their relationships with the state and are regularly favored
through large contracts, often allocated under non-competitive conditions.
Second, the firms that belong to this network of favoritism enjoy higher
profitability. This is due both to the irregular contracting conditions and to
the fact that procurement activities attract the best entrepreneurs, thereby
11See Informe Final, Comision de Verdad y Justicia (CVJ), Tomo IV, 2008.
12Rodriguez’s daughter was married to Stroessner’s elder son.
13Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998), Raúl Cubas Grau (1998-1999), Luis Ángel
González Macchi (1999-2003), and Nicanor Duarte Frutos (2003-2008).
14See Pérez-Liñán et al. (2006) and Richards (2008) for a description of the political
environment and institutional failures during that period. This situation is consistent with
evidence from other long-term single-party regimes and their failure to sustain economic
growth (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2003).
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siphoning off other sectors with greater development potential. They argued
that this was one of the main causes of the dismal long-run performance of
the Paraguayan economy. Indeed, from 1950 to 2000, despite extension of
the agricultural frontier to the east and the building of dams, the average
annual growth rate was 1.7%, not even covering the population growth rate,
which was between 2% and 3%.15
Note that the reason why successive governments were able to sustain
this large-scale rent-seeking system, despite dismal tax revenues which barely
exceeded 10% of GDP until 2008, was the large inflows of cash in terms of
royalties from the joint ownership of hydroelectric dams, especially Itaipú,
which represented around 5% of GDP throughout the 2000s. This effectively
enabled the rulers to disregard their taxation base and to maintain a system
that strongly disincentivized productive entrepreneurship, a form of resource
curse.
A New Government (2008-2012)
After a heated campaign in which popular discontent with corruption
ran high, the Lugo government took office in August 2008 in the context of
depressed economic activity. With a stated priority of attending to social
emergencies, the first measures included an increase in the number of bene-
ficiaries of conditional cash transfer programs from 5,000 to close to 100,000
in the following two years and the immediate and complete offering of health
services across the country. The other priorities were expenditures in educa-
tion and infrastructure (Borda, 2011). The dismal state of public institutions
and the scarcity of public resources soon became the number one constraint
faced by the new administration.
Over the next 3 years, the finance ministry managed to improve slightly
tax revenues, which went from 10 to 13.5% of GDP in 2011. However, due to
the lack of a majority in Congress it was unsuccessful in waging important
15Most of this average growth is in fact due to the very high rates corresponding to the
period when the hydroelectric dams were constructed. The average over 1977-1980 was
11% (Fernández Valdovinos and Monges Naranjo, 2004). In the 2000s, it was 2%.
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reforms, such as the introduction of the personal income tax, which would
significantly reduce possibilities of evasion, and the direct taxation of agro-
exporting sector, which in 2010 contributed 27% to GDP but only 0.3% to tax
revenues (Borda, 2011). The other policy priorities were improving budget
execution and changing the structure and practice of public procurement
and the direction of spending. Between 2007 and 2011, public procurement
spending went from 7.4% to 10.7% of GDP.16
The next section details the procurement data and provides descriptive
statistics to illustrate the evolution of spending.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
A significant change in the legal framework governing public procurement
occurred in 2003, when Law 2051/03 was enacted with the objective of pro-
moting transparency and efficiency. The database used in this study contains
nearly all the procurement transactions made from 2004 through 2011 be-
tween the public sector in a large sense and 12,047 different suppliers. It
covers 124,249 public purchase operations in all types of goods and services,
from office supplies to food, travel arrangements, oil purchases, and machin-
ery, among others. Each observation in the procurement dataset contains
the name and type of public entity, the name and legal registration number
(RUC) of the supplying firm, and information on the purchase, including the
nature of the good or service, grouped in 25 product categories, the total
cost in local currency, and the purchase mechanism used.17
This work analyzes the evolution of procurement practices from 2004
through 2011, in effect restricting the analysis to those institutions that were
16The Lugo government was removed through a constitutional coup in June 2012, when
its former Liberal ally struck a deal with the Colorado representatives in Congress and
grabbed the presidency.
17See Auriol, Straub, and Flochel (2011), and the Appendix for a detailed description
of the structure of the data.
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included throughout the whole period: the three main powers (executive,
judicial, and legislative), as well as public firms, autonomous public entities
(regulators and some sectorial institutes), social security institutions, the
central bank, and the comptroller general.18
The resulting dataset includes 101,083 observations from 59 public in-
stitutions and 9,193 firms. Total public spending amounts to Gs. 43,342
billion (approx. US $9.3 billion), which represents between 5.5% and 10.7%
of Paraguay’s annual GDP over the period.
Table A1 shows the distribution in terms of contracts and transaction
amounts by category of public institution and year, restricting the analysis
to sales by domestic private firms.19 The table shows that executive power,
which comprises most ministries, is responsible for close to 60% of all con-
tracts, followed by public firms, judicial power, and autonomous entities, each
representing around 10% of the total. In terms of value, executive power rep-
resents the largest category with 44% of spending, while public firms account
for 26%.
In terms of individual institutions, the main purchasers are the state elec-
tricity company (ANDE), the social security entity (IPS), the health ministry,
and the public works ministry, which together represent 52.8% of the total
procurement value over the period. The health ministry stands out by far as
18After 2008, the transparency requirements implied by the legal framework were applied
more thoroughly by including in the registers the operations of local entities (regional
governments and municipalities), the ombudsman, public financial institutions, and public
universities. However, newly included institutions represent less than 10% of total 2008-
2011 spending.
19The dataset also contains observations in which the seller is either another public
entity (68 transactions) or a foreign firm (836 transactions). While they represent only
0.9% of all transactions, these 904 transactions account for 43% of total spending. Indeed,
most of these purchases are large oil acquisition contracts by public firms, especially the
national oil company Petropar, from large foreign oil firms or intermediaries (e.g., Petróleos
de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), Petrobras (Brazil), Yacimiento Petroleo Fiscal (YPF) SA
(Argentina), Vitol Suiza, and Glencore International). While oil purchases are interesting
because they include a relatively small number of very large transactions, they stand out
in several respects as different from other procurement areas and are the object of separate
research. Results in this paper are largely robust to their inclusion.
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the institution with the highest number of transactions, slightly more than
one-fourth of the total.
This is mirrored in the breakdown of product categories. Health and
construction are noteworthy as sectors with intensive medium-sized procure-
ment. Indeed, in this eight-year period, the health ministry and the social
security entity generated more than 26,000 and 4,000 contracts, with an
average size of $25,000 and $200,000, respectively.20 In the construction sec-
tor, the public works ministry issued more than 2,000 road and other public
works repair or development contracts larger than $300,000 on average, while
the electricity company, in charge of transmission and distribution, executed
more than 5,000 contracts, with an average size close to $200,000.
In terms of variations over the period, Table A2 shows the changes in
total spending by category between 2005-2007 and 2009-2011, in terms of
both absolute amounts and percentage. It shows that the biggest absolute
increases are in public works and property construction and repair, health
products and services, and machines and transport equipment. On the other
hand, the largest reductions involve cleaning and maintenance services and
materials, which appear to relate mostly to vehicles, the purchase of spare
parts, tires, and other materials, and training. This suggests a marked de-
crease in expenditures (cars), which were either traditional perks or used in
political campaigning and other proselytizing activities.
5 Large Providers and Political Connections
The data display an important concentration of purchases. Over the whole
period, the top 200 domestic private providers in each given year accounted
for 69% of all expenditures.
The evolution of this group of private providers over the period 2004-2011,
20Health ministry purchases are mostly drugs, while the social security institute, which
is in charge of hospitals, also buys medical equipment, hence, the larger average size of
contracts.
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and in particular after the 2008 election, is therefore of particular interest.
Thus, two additional datasets were developed: first, the top 200 providers
in each year were identified, setting aside purely foreign providers . A list of
firms that were at least once in the top 200 during the 2004-2011 period was
then compiled, ending up with 695 private Paraguayan firms.21
A private Paraguayan consultancy was hired to build a record of the
identity and political affiliation or sympathy of all these firms’ directors. The
gathering of information proceeded by first finding the names of up to five
directors by firm, mostly from the local credit bureau.22 These names were
then crossed-checked against the listings of the two main political parties,
the Colorado Party (ANR) and the main historical opposition party, the
Liberal Party (PLRA). The listings were then completed through extensive
consultations with persons knowledgeable of the political environment, both
to include political sympathies not necessarily formalized in affiliations and
to extend the data to other smaller parties, which include a specter of center
to left political movements.23 Firms are classified as connected if a majority
of their directors are identified as members or sympathizers of a given party.24
Of the 695 firms included, 526 have some political connection (455 to the
ANR, 50 to the PLRA, 21 to other parties). However, until 2008, affiliation
with the ANR was widespread and not necessarily very informative because it
made it easier to enter almost any activity having some degree of interaction
with the public sector.
21One-third of these firms are active in all eight years, more than half in five years or
more.
22Most Paraguayan firms are family owned and with very few exceptions have fewer
than five directors.
23These include Democratia Cristiana, Encuentro Nacional, the Partido Febrerista, and
Patria Querida. They do not disclose public member listings. The definition of politi-
cal sympathies is easily identified in a small country with a limited entrepreneurial and
political class.
24Alternatively, a rule classifying a firm as connected if it has directors responding to a
given party, and only to that party, yields almost similar results. Only 6 ANR firms and
1 PLRA firm would be classified differently.
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I therefore further distinguished between two levels of political affiliation
with the ANR. ‘Rank and file’ affiliates are formal members, though not
influential. They are likely to belong to the party mostly for opportunistic
reasons, such as obtaining the right to operate or avoiding extortion. ‘Hierar-
chs,’ on the other hand, are, directly or through their close family, influential
members or have occupied important administrative functions and are con-
nected to the top levels of government. Firms responding to ANR core mem-
bers (hierarchs) represent approximately one-third of all ANR-related firms.
Table 1 summarizes the political affiliations of the firms in the sample.25
(Table 1 here)
6 Empirical Estimations
This section analyzes how the changes following the 2008 election affected
firms with different political ties in terms of their procurement outcomes.
Timing matters. In practice, it is likely that the political change did not
translate into new practices overnight. First, the public procurement process
implies important delays between the initial call for offers, the award, and the
final execution of the contract. Second, the initial move to procure goods or
services, through the definition of the call itself, is the result of political and
administrative planning processes that take time. Third, conversations with
public officials indicate that the new government had very little practical
experience when it took over in August 2008 and that, as a result, purchases
related to the new policy priorities were only fully implemented from 2009
on. Finally, firms may require some time to adjust their behavior or realize
specific investments related to addressing new procurement requirements.
Based on this, the specifications will consider either a transition in 2008 and
25Additional information includes incorporation date, sector of main activity, integrated
capital, number of buildings, city of location, juridical status, and number of incidents
registered in the main Paraguayan (private) credit bureau, Informconf.
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a new regime starting in 2009 or a transition in 2008-2009 and a new regime
starting in 2010.
Consider the following model, which makes use of the full panel structure
of the data to elicit the effect of political connections:
lnYit = β0(POLi ∗Transt)+β1(POLi ∗Aftert)+X
′
itβ2+ νi+ νt+ εit, (1)
where lnYit is the variable of interest (i.e., the log of (1 +) the amount of
sales to the public sector of each firm i in year t), POLi is a firm-specific
indicator of political relationship, Transt and Aftert are dummy variables
taking the value of 1 for the transition and the new regime periods respec-
tively, Xit are firm-specific time-variant controls, specified below, and νi and
νt are firm and time fixed effects, respectively. Identification thus arises from
within-firm variations over time in the log amount of contracts received. The
use of growth rates rather than levels, through the log specification of the de-
pendent variable, addresses the possibility that firms may have specific time
trends. Most specifications include political indicator variables for the gov-
ernment party before 2008 (the ANR, further divided into ‘core’ and ‘rank’
subsamples), the PLRA, and an “opposition” pool aggregating the other four
small opposition parties, non-connected firms being the excluded category.
Additionally, it is necessary to control for the type of activity firms per-
form in terms of public procurement. Indeed, specific goods and services
category trends, themselves related to changing policies or other exogenous
shocks, will affect firms differentially according to their specialization. If firms
with political ties happen to be more active in specific areas of procurement,
results from estimating (1) may mistakenly attribute to changing political
favors the effects of a modification in the structure of purchases across cate-
gories. To address this concern, a set of variables was constructed, including
"product dummies" that capture for each firm whether it is active in a given
category in each year, and its "product share," meaning the year-by-year
value of its sales in each good or service category divided by the total amount
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procured in that category. These controls are more appropriate than sector
dummies because in this sample most firms are in effect "multi-product" and
are active in several categories simultaneously.26
The results from estimating (1) in the sample of 695 firms are shown in
Table 2. Column 1 presents the basic results with the main political affilia-
tions (ANR, PLRA, opposition) interacted with dummies for the transition
and post-transition periods, controlling for firms’ fixed effects and product
dummies. PLRA firms appear to have significantly increased the log value
of their procurement contracts during the transition phase and to a lesser
extent after that, with marginal effects of 36% and 24%, respectively. On
the other hand, the effect for ANR firms is positive in the transition and
negative after that, but fails to differ significantly from zero. Finally, other
opposition firms display negative but non-significant effects.
(Table 2 here)
Column 2 disaggregates ANR affiliation between rank and core mem-
bers. There is now a strongly significant decrease in contracts after 2008 for
core ANR members, while the effect is indistinguishable from zero for rank
members. Column 3 adds product shares as firm-level time variant controls.
This only reinforces the results, as core ANR firms experience a significant
decrease both during the transition and after. Marginal effects are sizable,
lying between -15% and -17%. Columns 4 through 6 repeat these estimations
using a longer transition period (2008-2009), with very similar results.27
Figure 1 plots the coefficients of the interactions between the political
indicator variables and dummy variables for each year from 2005 to 2011,
from a specification using the same controls as columns 3 and 6 in Table
2. The solid line connects the coefficients, while the dotted lines plot the
90% confidence interval derived from robust standard errors clustered at the
26Almost 60% is active in at least two distinct sectors.
27The results are also robust to excluding the top firms in terms of amount of contracts
received (not shown to save space).
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firm level. In line with the results above, the figure shows a negative and
significant change in contracts to core ANR entrepreneurs in 2008, 2010, and
2011 in the upper-right quadrant (1.B) and a positive and significant increase
for PLRA firms in 2008 in the bottom-left quadrant (1.C).28
Tables 3 and 4 delve into the channels for these results. Table 3 first looks
at amounts attributed without competition through the exception mecha-
nism. As discussed in Auriol et al. (2011), this was a major channel of
irregularities in the first few years after the enactment of the new procure-
ment law and one that was specifically used to award contracts to targeted
firms. The results show a decrease across the board in terms of the log value
of such contracts received by firms connected to all political groups, but these
are only marginally statistically significant for PLRA and other opposition
firms during the transition. While the results are consistent with a cleansing
of the procurement process,29 they also suggest that the use of exception was
not the dominant mechanism in awarding contracts to connected firms and
that these firms benefited from all types of contracts. This is not surprising
given that exceptions began to decrease as early as 2006, as shown in Auriol
et al. (2011).
(Table 3 here)
Table 4 analyzes the evolution of connected firms’ portfolios across specific
product categories. It presents the results from the following specification:




where Zi is a dummy variable relating alternatively to two specific subsets of
product categories: the fastest growing and the biggest. After 2008, spending
28The corresponding estimations are in Table A3, column 2, in the Appendix.
29This could reflect both a reduction in wrongdoing and an efficiency improvement due,
for example, to learning with the new legal framework.
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increased rapidly, as evidenced by the share of procurement in GDP almost
doubling over the period under analysis, going from 5.5% in 2004 to 10.7% in
2011. As described in section 4 above, this was clearly driven by a subset of
categories and was largely a response to the new policy priorities. The first
measure therefore relates to the product categories experiencing an above-
the-median absolute increase between 2005-2007 and 2009-2011.
Moreover, it is likely that categories with a significant initial turnover of
purchase may have different dynamics. Indeed, one would expect that even
before 2008 they offered more possibility for opposition or non-connected
entrepreneurs to win at least marginal amounts of public contracts, and that
after 2008 these fringe firms would readily generate more competition for
public contracts. To test this, I computed the sum of contracts awarded
per category, using specifically the 2005-2007 period, which includes 37,334
procurement operations, and classified as "big" those with values above the
median.30
The dummy variables for these two measures were assigned a value of 1
if firm i had at least some activity in a "fast growing" or "big" category.31
Robustness checks were also conducted for a smaller subset of the top "fast
growing" or "big" categories.
(Table 4 here)
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present the results for "fast growing" cate-
gories, where the subset included is those above the median or, alternatively,
the seven largest. They reveal a pattern in which, after the transition period,
ANR rank firms actually lost in the largest categories, while compensating
these losses in the smaller ones. However, a Wald test rejected the equality of
effects during the transition; that is , the sum of the coefficients for the small
30The year 2004 is excluded as it is the first year in which purchases were registered
according to the new law. The transition period is set to include 2008.
31Note that the new government priorities, public works and health, are among both
the biggest categories and the largest seven categories.
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and big product categories is not equal to zero, indicating that gains did
not compensate losses. A somewhat similar pattern emerges for core ANR
firms, although in this case only the losses in large categories are statistically
significant. As for opposition firms, PLRA firms display gains in smaller
categories, partially compensated by losses in bigger categories (equality re-
jected in the transition, not rejected after that), while no significant effects
appear for other opposition firms.
Looking next at big pre-2008 categories, columns 3 and 4 show that both
during and after the transition, ANR rank firms experienced a reduction
in their portfolio, while compensating for this in smaller categories. The
Wald test failed to reject equality of effects during the transition, indicating
that gains compensated losses, but it rejected it for the period 2009-2011,
where the coefficient for losses is larger. Again, similar tests are rejected
for core ANR firms, indicating that they only partially compensated in large
categories for their losses in smaller ones. A similar pattern also affects PLRA
firms after the transition, with gains compensating losses.
These results are disaggregated in Figure 2, which plots the coefficients of
the interactions among the political indicator variables, dummy variables for
each year from 2005 through 2011, and a dummy variable for "big" sectors.32
In the upper-left quadrant (2.A), which tracks ANR rank entrepreneurs, the
substitution of contracts in small product categories for those in big ones is
clearly apparent starting in 2008 and gets stronger afterward. In the upper-
right quadrant (2.B.), ANR core entrepreneurs display the same pattern in
2009, but for them the increase in contracts in small categories becomes
insignificant afterward, while the decrease in contracts in big categories re-
mains significantly negative, explaining their overall losses. Finally, PLRA
firms display only a mildly positive increase in small categories in 2011.
These results are consistent with a scenario in which, in the pre-2008
situation, connected entrepreneurs were coping with procurement contracts
32The corresponding estimations are in Table A3, column 6, in the Appendix.
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in smaller categories, while larger categories were more open to other non-
connected firms. As these connected entrepreneurs were winning contracts
not on the basis of being more competitive, but through political favor, they
were more likely to be outplayed after 2008 in categories where competi-
tion was restored, especially if the volume of procurement grew rapidly. On
the other hand, in product categories that had historically excluded non-
connected firms, connected firms were able to take advantage of incumbency
to improve their position after 2008. This is true even for core ANR entre-
preneurs, who appear to have benefited in these smaller and slow-growing
categories, although not enough to compensate their overall losses.
This indicates a pattern in which connected entrepreneurs were distrib-
uted across the whole range of procurement activities. When these activities
were characterized by larger volumes, the space available for non-connected
entrepreneurs was more important, and this clearly made the shift toward a
less politicized set of suppliers easier after 2008. Thus, it is to be expected
that efficiency gains were larger in these sectors because able competitors
were present.
In addition, the fact that ANR rank entrepreneurs struggled to maintain
their position when faced with more open competition after 2008 indicates
that they were less efficient to start with and were only in business thanks
to their political connections. In that sense, political favoritism affected
the composition of the entrepreneurial class well beyond the first circle of
connected core ANR entrepreneurs.
Overall, these results indicate an important role for firms’ political con-
nections during and after the 2008 transition. ANR core members were
clearly "punished," while PLRA firms benefited mostly in the initial period
of the new government, in which the Liberal Party more actively supported
the new government.33 The effect appears to concentrate in the larger, fastest
growing sectors, and non-connected firms appeared to be the main benefi-
33The Liberal Party finally actively participated in the eviction of Lugo in June 2012.
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ciaries of the losses of connected entrepreneurs. Thus, rather than political
favors only representing an additional advantage for equally talented indi-
viduals, the results suggest a misallocation of talents, in which low-ability
entrepreneurs prevailed against those with higher ability.
The following section inquires further into the efficiency effects of the
post-2008 evolution by looking at entry into the procurement business and
at the evolution in types of procedures used to allocate contracts.
7 Political Connections, Democratization, and
Efficiency
In addition to substituting politically connected and thus potentially less
efficient firms for non-connected firms , efficiency might have improved after
2008 through enhanced competition or through a shift to "better" providers.
Here, I focus on proxies for the level of competition in public procurement,
specifically, the number of suppliers active per product category and the types
of attribution procedures used. As for the quality of providers, I consider
whether firms have antecedents of bank incidents registered in the local credit
bureau.
The analysis aggregates the full dataset so as to track the effect of changes
in the amount of contracts awarded to politically connected firms on the
evolution of the variables above at the institution-year level. Moreover, it
uses the results of the previous section to instrument the evolution of the
amount of these contracts with the political break that occurred in 2008,
interacted with specific characteristics of the institutions.
Formally, the equation to be estimated is:
Yit = γ0 + γ1AmountPoljt +X
′
jtγ2 + νj + νt + εjt, (3)
where Yit is the institution-year-level variable of interest (i.e., number of sup-
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pliers active, share of contracts made by type of procedure, share of suppliers
with bank antecedents), AmountPoljt is the (log of) the sum of contracts
each institution j is giving to politically connected firms in a given year t,
Xjt are institution-specific time-variant controls, specified below, and νj and
νt are institution and time fixed effects, respectively.
The identification strategy relies on using the political change of 2008 and
on the fact that it affected some institutions more than others.34 The first
stage is therefore defined as:




jtδ2 + νj + νt + εjt, (4)
where the instrumental variable is the interaction of a dummy for the pe-
riod after the political change (Aftert) with a vector of two variables Zj,
composed of a dummy capturing whether the institution relies on several
subcontracting units to operationalize procurement contracts and the share
of political contracts in its portfolio in the 2004-2007 period.
The rationale for the first measure is that the new government had rela-
tively few experienced staff when it took over. Hence, it was comparatively
more difficult to replace and/or control procurement officials with a large
number of subcontracting units, as was, for example, the case in large min-
istries. As of 2007, of 50 institutions, 17 had more than one subcontracting
unit, with numbers ranging between 2 and 22. The second measure relies on
the fact that more political pressure is expected on institutions that had a
large share of political contracts before 2008.
(Table 5 here)
The first stage in Appendix Table 5 shows that the instruments have
the expected effect and are significant. Institutions with a high share of
34Duflo (2001) used a similar specification to estimate the impact of a school construction
program on labor market outcomes in Indonesia.
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political contracts until 2007 experience relatively larger reductions, while
those having several subcontracting units display opposite results. The F-
statistics reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak for a bias of
the instrumental variables (IV) estimator relative to the bias of the ordinary
least squares (OLS) not exceeding 15% (see Stock and Yogo, 2005).35 The
results from the second stage are shown in Table 6.
(Table 6 here)
Panel A shows the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates of (3), where
the post-change period is set to be the 2008-2011 period and connected firms
are taken to be core Colorado entrepreneurs with strong links to the previous
regime. Column 1 shows that a reduction in the log amount of contracts to
such political firms implies a reduction in the number of firms with which
an institution contracted after 2008. In column 2, the concentration index,
computed as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of purchases across sup-
pliers, is negative, meaning that concentration increases with the reduction in
contracts to connected firms, but it fails to be significant. Columns 3 through
7 provide a view into the channels at play. Indeed, the political change also
led these institutions to use a bigger share of competitive contracts in general
(the tender category in column 3, which includes all contracts giving rise to
an open tender) and, more specifically, the type of tendering arising for con-
tracts of a size just above the threshold between direct contracting and small
tenders (the call for offers category in column 4). Finally, column 8 indicates
that fewer contracts to connected firms also translated into a higher share of
contracts to firms with antecedents of bank incidents as signaled by the local
credit bureau. Note that the instruments pass the test of overidentifying
restrictions, which F-statistics are shown in square brackets.
A number of robustness checks sustain these results. First, following the
discussion of the length of the transition period in section 6 above, Panel B
35Using only the first instrumental variable yields very similar second stage results, and
a first stage excluded instrument F-statistic of 12.28.
24
repeats these estimations, now using 2009-2011 as the post-change period,
with very similar results. Second, in Panel C, a placebo test looks at the
evolution between the 2004-2005 and 2006-2007 periods, using as instruments
the share of political contracts in institutions’ portfolio in 2004-2005 and the
subcontracting dummy. The test yields only insignificant results, as expected.
Finally, the pre-2008 institution-level share of political contracts does not
predict the post-2008 evolution of the outcome variables in a regression where
it is interacted with the whole set of year dummies, with the exception of
“licitacions.”36
The implied marginal effects are sizable. A 1% decrease in the amount
of contracts to connected firms in an institution’s yearly budget translates
to 5.5% fewer providers and a 3.7 point increase in the share of calls for
offers (a 2.4 point increase in the share of open tenders overall). Fixing other
covariates at their mean, going from an institution-year observation at the
75th percentile in terms of the amount of contracts to connected firms to one
at the 25th percentile would translate into a 20% decrease in the number of
firms and an increase in the share of calls for offers from 9.4% to 24.8%.
Overall, the results are consistent with the finding in the previous sec-
tion. In a context of abrupt political change, entrepreneurs closely connected
to the previous regime were punished and their share of public procurement
reduced. However, this shift was not directly balanced by the entry of new en-
trepreneurs, either connected to the new regime or with no open connections,
as witnessed by the reduction in the average number of firms. A possible ex-
planation is the absence of such entrepreneurs in the short to medium term,
as the long-lasting grip of the Colorado regime discouraged entrepreneurship
by opposition members. On the other hand, it is also possible that pro-
curement contracts were previously inefficiently divided between too many
firms.
36Licitacions are open tenders for contracts above 10,000 mdw. Results not shown to
save space.
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The reduction in the number of firms was accompanied by a substitu-
tion between contracts awarded through direct purchase mechanisms and
contracts subject to tendering, as shown by the decrease in the share of con-
tracts just below the tendering threshold of the 2,000 minimum daily wage
(mdw) and the increase in the share of contracts made through simple ten-
ders in the range between 2,000 and 10,000 mdw (call for offers). As the new
authorities used fewer but bigger and more competitive contracts to reduce
the amount of public procurement going to firms connected to the previous
regime, it is likely that there were efficiency gains, although it is difficult
to evaluate the extent to which this was constrained by the low number of
potential new suppliers.
Panels D and E provide evidence of such limitations. Panel D presents
the estimation of (3) on the subsample of contracts corresponding to the
product categories with a cumulated number of suppliers above the median
in the early 2004-2007 period. The results are consistent with those of panels
A and B. A decrease in political contracts translates into a significant decrease
in the number of suppliers, and the coefficient is 24% to 35% larger than in
the whole sample. It also induces significant increases in the concentration
of purchases, which is now significant at the 1% level, and in the share of
contracts made through a competitive call for offers. Finally, in contrast to
the results above, it also corresponds to a shift toward a mix of firms with
a lesser history of previous bank incidents, which can be interpreted as an
indicator of better quality providers.
The marginal effects are also larger. Comparing the 25th and the 75th
percentile yields a 25% reduction in the number of suppliers, an increase in
the share of calls for offers from 6.8% to 23.4%, and a reduction in the share
of providers with a history of bank incidents from 15.7% to 10.6%.
In contrast, in panel E, which shows the results for the subsample of prod-
uct categories with a cumulated number of suppliers below the median, all
the results become insignificant. These results are consistent with a scenario
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in which the reduced number of potential competitors able to supply specific
products constrained the introduction of competition after 2008.
8 Conclusion
The paper has looked at how a landmark political change that occurred in
Paraguay in 2008, when an opposition coalition defeated the Colorado Party,
which had held power for 61 years, affected the allocation of public pro-
curement across different categories of firms. Using data on all the public
procurement transactions from 2004 through 2011, and on the political con-
nections of the 700 largest public providers, the results show a depolitization
of procurement after 2008 through a reduction in contracts awarded to firms
connected to the first ring of power, the core Colorado entrepreneurs, mostly
to the benefit of non-connected firms and to a lesser extent of firms connected
to the former opposition, which may respond to the non-aligned nature of
the new government.
Consistent with the decade-long monopolization of power of the Colorado
regime leaving few alternative providers present in the market, the reduction
in political contracts translated into public institutions using bigger con-
tracts under explicitly competitive mechanisms and contracting with fewer
and more efficient firms. While some efficiency gains appeared in this process,
there was also evidence of binding constraints, in particular those related to
the time needed for an efficient class of entrepreneurs to emerge.
These results also shed light on how, following democratization, the char-
acteristics of the Paraguayan long-term authoritarian dominant-party regime
made reforms difficult for the new government. In contrast to the evidence
that authoritarian regimes may be able to reform themselves, as in the case
of Taiwan and Mexico in the 1980s (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995), the possi-
bility to transition out of the development trap created by widespread rent-
seeking entrepreneurship appears to have been limited in Paraguay. The
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inherited non-existence of a strong independent private sector led to a lack
of room to maneuver for the new government and, together with the other
policy constraints, eventually contributed to the government’s fall through a
parliamentary coup in 2012.
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The 2.051/03 law of public procurement regulates purchases according to their value computed in 
terms of minimum daily wage (mdw). In the period of study, the value of the mdw fluctuated 
between approximately US $6 and $10. 
Contracts above 10,000 mdw are made through a public tendering ("licitacion"). The call for offers 
must be published in the national press for a minimum of three days, as well as in the official 
newsletter and website. Requirements and criteria for evaluation are restricted to technically 
indispensable requisites. If several offers comply with these requirements, the one with the lowest 
price wins. All bids and winning offers are published on the National Directorate of Public 
Procurement (DNCP) website. 
For contracts between 2,000 and 10,000 mdw, a competitive bidding process must be organized 
("concurso de oferta"). This does not require the call for offers to be published in the national press, 
but it must be published on the DNCP website and at least five different firms must make an offer. 
Below 2,000 mdw, contracts can be allocated directly without an auction, provided the call has 
been published on the DNCP website and at least three official offers from different firms have 
been received. Last, spending worth less than 20 mdw can be realized without justification through 
a `fixed funds' mechanism from a single supplier. 
Finally, the law addresses the possibility of disregarding the rules above in cases of "force 
majeure," such as emergencies, natural disasters, health epidemics, purchase of patented or 
copyrighted goods, or purchase requiring secrecy for reasons of defense. In these circumstances, 
institutions can purchase directly and without any requirements from a firm of their choice through 




Table A1 : 2004 – 2011 evolution of spending by categories of institutions (private domestic suppliers only) 
Number of contracts 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Total (%) 
Central bank 52 64 87 124 136 163 186 158 970 1,0% 
Comptroller General  65 128 120 52 92 74 84 78 693 0,7% 
Mixt public firms 222 297 294 233 152 352 257 244 2051 2,0% 
Public firms 1133 1090 1327 1674 1304 1417 971 1146 10062 10,0% 
Autonomous entities 748 879 1120 1126 1130 1339 1417 1479 9238 9,2% 
Social security entities 545 474 469 566 647 796 693 574 4764 4,8% 
Executive power 6356 7330 7912 7056 7311 6703 8091 9052 59811 59,7% 
Judicial power 749 1126 1317 975 1247 1286 1449 1514 9663 9,6% 
Legislative power 353 406 435 348 297 361 353 374 2927 2,9% 
Total 10223 11794 13081 12154 12316 12491 13501 14619 100179 
 Amounts (bn. Guaranies) 
          Central bank 18.0 4.2 25.5 8.4 54.8 70.3 69.4 114.4 365.0 1,5% 
Comptroller General  0.9 1.8 3.2 2.2 5.3 5.0 13.9 2.9 35.3 0,1% 
Mixt public firms 70.1 84.2 130.9 132.3 50.5 189.1 228.8 248.9 1134.8 4,6% 
Public firms 478.2 508.8 567.9 724.2 942.6 950.4 1183.0 962.6 6317.7 25,5% 
Autonomous entities 32.1 95.1 87.6 136.5 118.1 268.3 213.4 408.6 1359.7 5,5% 
Social security entities 180.7 273.4 226.7 314.5 348.6 559.2 605.7 803.2 3312.0 13,4% 
Executive power 487.0 469.7 702.6 627.2 1127.0 1710.0 2896.0 2904.0 10923.5 44,1% 
Judicial power 28.9 63.7 106.9 94.6 120.8 164.5 256.1 194.2 1029.7 4,2% 
Legislative power 11.4 22.7 22.6 25.8 36.5 35.4 30.1 109.2 293.7 1,2% 
Total 1307.3 1523.6 1873.9 2065.8 2804.2 3952.1 5496.4 5748.0 24771.3 





Table A2 : Changes in amounts spend by categories (in bn. Guaranies) 
Categories 2005-07 2009-11 Variation % 
Public works and properties contruction and repairs 655.4 3554.0 2898.6 442.26% 
Health products, materials and services 945.8 2598.4 1652.6 174.73% 
Machines, major tools and transport equipments 245.4 1304.2 1058.8 431.46% 
Military and security equipment 95.0 785.1 690.1 726.42% 
Transport and travel 199.6 697.3 497.7 249.35% 
Oil and lubricants 345.6 834.6 489.0 141.49% 
Properties adquisition and renting 89.8 533.3 443.5 493.88% 
Food products 99.6 489.4 389.8 391.37% 
Computing equipments and softwares 476.5 819.4 343.0 71.96% 
Technical services 57.2 388.8 331.6 579.72% 
Insurance 44.3 367.8 323.5 730.25% 
Office stationary, papers and printed material 292.5 615.3 322.8 110.36% 
Consulting and studies 69.8 205.6 135.9 194.56% 
Minerals 4.8 110.8 106.0 2208.33% 
furniture 62.2 137.0 74.8 120.26% 
Ceremonies and receptions 88.4 158.8 70.4 79.64% 
Quimical products 75.7 135.2 59.5 78.60% 
Textile and clothes 72.2 92.5 20.3 28.12% 
Advertisement 121.2 139.6 18.4 15.18% 
Kitchen materials and glass products 7.2 11.7 4.4 62.50% 
Agricultural and forestal goods and materials 11.6 14.8 3.2 27.59% 
Training 58.2 58.0 -0.2 -0.34% 
Tools and electric, plastic and other materials 503.3 468.0 -35.3 -7.01% 
Cleaning materials 71.1 28.6 -42.6 -59.77% 
Cleaning, maintenance and repairs 731.3 648.0 -83.3 -11.39% 


















Cat   Fast growing Fast growing Big Big 
ANRrank*2005 -0.119 -0.123 -0.286 -0.323 0.086 0.109 
 
(0.854) (0.743) (0.922) (0.806) (0.947) (0.755) 
ANRrank*2006 0.006 0.202 -1.208 -1.259 -0.970 -0.790 
 
(0.891) (0.767) (0.974) (0.807) (0.800) (0.632) 
ANRrank*2007 -0.122 -0.738 -1.216 -1.474 -0.796 -1.463 
 
(0.926) (0.837) (1.137) (1.052) (1.045) (0.899) 
ANRrank*2008 0.540 0.504 1.083 1.019 2.923 2.853 
 
(1.009) (0.913) (1.395) (1.298) (1.368)** (1.253)** 
ANRrank*2009 -0.479 -0.486 2.405 2.057 3.510 3.327 
 
(0.982) (0.895) (1.416)* (1.307) (1.379)** (1.225)*** 
ANRrank*2010 0.081 0.062 3.462 2.502 4.282 3.785 
 
(1.034) (0.925) (1.517)** (1.400)* (1.428)*** (1.281)*** 
ANRrank*2011 -0.755 -0.854 3.668 2.971 5.425 4.915 
 
(1.076) (0.992) (1.612)** (1.513)** (1.493)*** (1.363)*** 
ANRcore*2005 0.435 0.321 -1.117 -0.746 -0.674 -0.573 
 
(1.076) (0.973) (1.288) (1.075) (1.035) (0.842) 
ANRcore*2006 -0.887 -0.286 -2.927 -2.395 -1.427 -1.139 
 
(1.043) (0.934) (1.381)** (1.143)** (1.045) (0.828) 
ANRcore*2007 -1.192 -1.236 -1.536 -1.984 -0.503 -1.475 
 
(1.111) (0.970) (1.696) (1.302) (1.563) (1.035) 
ANRcore*2008 -1.744 -1.865 0.138 -1.141 3.465 1.133 
 
(1.168) (1.056)* (1.936) (1.571) (2.091)* (1.714) 
ANRcore*2009 -1.950 -1.293 0.565 0.689 4.170 4.076 
 
(1.169)* (1.069) (1.970) (1.770) (2.038)** (1.870)** 
ANRcore*2010 -1.847 -1.996 -0.356 -1.674 3.691 1.969 
 
(1.215) (1.090)* (2.119) (1.780) (2.140)* (1.823) 
ANRcore*2011 -2.972 -2.998 -1.903 -2.092 0.587 0.351 
 
(1.237)** (1.123)*** (1.960) (1.704) (2.001) (1.820) 
PLRA*2005 0.025 0.349 0.339 0.206 -1.173 -1.069 
 
(1.348) (1.290) (1.739) (1.665) (1.420) (1.220) 
PLRA*2006 0.945 1.220 -0.163 -1.163 -0.363 -1.295 
 




      
PLRA*2007 -0.221 -0.415 -2.358 -2.650 -2.638 -2.750 
 
(1.424) (1.377) (1.201)* (1.149)** (1.427)* (1.228)** 
PLRA*2008 3.303 2.793 2.724 2.212 1.580 1.270 
 
(1.545)** (1.410)** (1.924) (1.751) (2.546) (2.272) 
PLRA*2009 2.268 1.860 4.200 3.796 3.125 2.953 
 
(1.565) (1.481) (2.071)** (1.983)* (2.736) (2.542) 
PLRA*2010 1.787 1.456 3.963 4.109 3.408 3.755 
 
(1.685) (1.587) (2.042)* (2.044)** (2.643) (2.540) 
PLRA*2011 2.940 2.109 6.317 5.409 5.779 5.008 
 
(1.762)* (1.673) (2.515)** (2.380)** (2.767)** (2.493)** 
OPOS*2005 1.708 3.519 0.082 0.005 -7.216 1.527 
 
(2.024) (1.513)** (0.713) (0.620) (6.051) (2.131) 
OPOS*2006 -2.790 -0.068 -0.657 -0.547 -7.969 0.962 
 
(2.021) (1.699) (0.730) (0.606) (6.053) (2.131) 
OPOS*2007 0.064 1.297 -1.376 -1.667 -8.681 -0.154 
 
(2.269) (1.800) (0.728)* (0.636)*** (6.053) (2.139) 
OPOS*2008 -1.205 0.315 4.625 4.190 -5.027 3.509 
 
(2.425) (2.004) (5.158) (4.871) (8.705) (3.743) 
OPOS*2009 -1.210 0.467 -3.476 -3.518 -10.769 -1.978 
 
(2.018) (1.557) (0.808)*** (0.741)*** (6.062)* (2.169) 
OPOS*2010 -0.572 0.394 3.969 3.685 -5.822 2.806 
 
(2.518) (2.161) (5.467) (5.310) (8.899) (4.047) 
OPOS*2011 -0.788 1.028 -3.879 -4.011 -11.167 -2.466 
 
(2.566) (2.282) (0.870)*** (0.809)*** (6.070)* (2.203) 
ANRrank*cat*2005   0.243 0.280 -0.230 -0.268 
 
  (0.837) (0.727) (0.851) (0.663) 
ANRrank*cat*2006   1.607 1.969 1.240 1.293 
 
  (0.911)* (0.802)** (0.722)* (0.620)** 
ANRrank*cat*2007   1.402 0.937 0.814 0.882 
 
  (1.124) (1.065) (1.028) (0.922) 
ANRrank*cat*2008   -0.709 -0.678 -3.038 -3.001 
 
  (1.310) (1.223) (1.276)** (1.177)** 
ANRrank*cat*2009   -3.802 -3.350 -5.091 -4.857 
 
  (1.331)*** (1.231)*** (1.283)*** (1.142)*** 
ANRrank*cat*2010   -4.472 -3.235 -5.367 -4.758 
 
  (1.436)*** (1.328)** (1.343)*** (1.205)*** 
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ANRrank*cat*2011   -5.867 -5.085 -7.913 -7.393 
 
  (1.537)*** (1.434)*** (1.408)*** (1.273)*** 
ANRcore*cat*2005   2.116 1.447 1.364 1.076 
 
  (1.482) (1.303) (1.238) (1.077) 
ANRcore*cat*2006   2.747 2.863 0.614 0.995 
 
  (1.498)* (1.329)** (1.191) (1.048) 
ANRcore*cat*2007   0.406 0.928 -0.920 0.171 
 
  (1.834) (1.456) (1.706) (1.208) 
ANRcore*cat*2008   -2.540 -0.965 -6.409 -3.683 
 
  (1.991) (1.637) (2.127)*** (1.752)** 
ANRcore*cat*2009   -3.395 -2.683 -7.520 -6.617 
 
  (2.037)* (1.839) (2.086)*** (1.910)*** 
ANRcore*cat*2010   -1.987 -0.399 -6.790 -4.854 
 
  (2.173) (1.847) (2.188)*** (1.861)*** 
ANRcore*cat*2011   -1.453 -1.240 -4.392 -4.145 
 
  (2.039) (1.764) (2.066)** (1.852)** 
PLRA*cat*2005   -0.405 0.265 1.834 2.158 
 
  (2.198) (2.174) (1.986) (1.898) 
PLRA*cat*2006   1.696 3.653 1.909 3.715 
 
  (2.427) (1.878)* (2.554) (1.882)** 
PLRA*cat*2007   3.189 3.363 3.453 3.384 
 
  (2.014) (2.024)* (2.084)* (2.018)* 
PLRA*cat*2008   0.809 0.828 2.434 2.170 
 
  (2.463) (2.238) (2.846) (2.553) 
PLRA*cat*2009   -2.968 -2.994 -1.338 -1.668 
 
  (2.595) (2.503) (3.040) (2.866) 
PLRA*cat*2010   -3.340 -4.074 -2.439 -3.422 
 
  (2.699) (2.661) (3.071) (2.966) 
PLRA*cat*2011   -5.225 -5.094 -4.301 -4.347 
 
  (3.045)* (2.912)* (3.212) (2.975) 
OPOS*cat*2005   1.861 3.896 10.508 2.439 
 
  (2.083) (1.476)*** (6.244)* (2.532) 
OPOS*cat*2006   -2.422 0.477 5.947 -1.206 
 
  (2.091) (1.781) (6.295) (2.715) 
OPOS*cat*2007   1.451 3.118 10.004 1.532 
 
  (2.339) (1.807)* (6.344) (2.738) 




  (5.634) (5.198) (8.930) (4.172) 
OPOS*cat*2009   2.360 4.268 10.972 2.755 
 
  (1.988) (1.437)*** (6.198)* (2.485) 
OPOS*cat*2010   -5.123 -3.718 6.004 -2.838 
 
  (5.959) (5.672) (9.136) (4.518) 
OPOS*cat*2011   3.279 5.425 11.932 3.970 
 
  (2.638) (2.309)** (6.452)* (3.108) 
Firms F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product shares  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.32 0.43 0.33 0.44 0.34 0.44 
N 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 
Notes: Results from an OLS model, where the dependent variable is the log of (1+) the yearly total amounts of public contracts received by each firm. In columns 1 
and 2, explanatory variables are the interactions of the dummy variables indicating political connection (ANRrank/ANRcore, PLRA and OPOS) and year dummies 
(2005 to 2011, 2004 is the excluded year). In columns 3 to 6, specifications include a triple interaction with Cat. Cat is a dummy variable for the fastest growing 
product categories between the 2005-2007 and the 2009-2011 sub-periods (13 categories above the median) in columns 3 and 4, and a dummy variable for the biggest 
product categories in the 2005-2007 sub-period (13 categories above the median) in columns 5 and 6. Column 2 estimates are represented in Figure1, while column 




Figure 1: Year-by-year interaction coefficients of the change in amounts of contracts by type of connections 
 
Note: In each Figure, the solid line plots the coefficients from the interaction between the relevant political connection dummy and year dummies. Controls are based 





















































Figure 2: Year-by-year interaction coefficients of the change in amounts of contracts by type of connections and product 
categories (big vs. small) 
 
Note: Each Figure plots the coefficients from the interaction between the relevant political connection dummy, year dummies, and product categories (below or 
above the median size in the 2005-2007 sample) as well as the 90% confidence interval derived from robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level. The solid 
lines represent the outcome for the group of big product categories, while the dotted lines correspond to the group of small product categories. Controls are the same 



































































Table 1: Number of connected firms active in each year 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Overall 
ANR total 260 254 270 272 287 298 299 273 455 
ANR rank 170 165 181 184 197 201 202 188 301 
ANR core 90 89 89 88 90 97 97 85 154 
Opposition 45 47 45 44 52 54 53 53 71 
PLRA 28 29 32 29 37 38 37 38 50 
DEM CRIST 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ENC NAC 1 3 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 
PART FEB 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 
PATRIA 11 10 8 10 10 10 10 9 13 
No connection 89 87 99 104 100 109 107 106 169 


















 Trans : 2008 Trans : 2008 Trans : 2008 Trans : 2008-09 Trans : 2008-09 Trans : 2008-09 
ANR*trans -0.055   -0.428   
 (0.730)   (0.631)   
ANR*after -0.841   -0.860   
 (0.644)   (0.699)   
ANRrank*trans  0.598 0.674  0.495 0.750 
  (0.772) (0.705)  (0.730) (0.665) 
ANRrank*after  -0.328 -0.262  -0.293 -0.286 
  (0.685) (0.627)  (0.673) (0.615) 
ANRcore*trans  -1.334 -1.560  -1.430 -1.241 
  (0.888) (0.813)*  (0.761)* (0.700)* 
ANRcore*after  -1.848 -1.796  -2.008 -2.230 
  (0.806)** (0.743)**  (0.856)** (0.787)*** 
PLRA*trans 3.103 3.120 2.517 2.591 2.609 2.087 
 (1.165)*** (1.166)*** (1.089)** (1.094)** (1.087)** (1.027)** 
PLRA*after 2.144 2.146 1.530 2.177 2.168 1.468 
 (1.164)* (1.164)* (1.082) (1.279)* (1.262)* (1.178) 
OPOS*trans -0.947 -0.952 -0.875 -0.950 -0.945 -0.763 
 (1.540) (1.543) (1.380) (1.153) (1.146) (0.967) 
OPOS*after -0.603 -0.604 -0.563 -0.419 -0.431 -0.516 
 (1.281) (1.284) (1.174) (1.642) (1.632) (1.550) 
Firms F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product shares   yes   yes 
R2 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.31 0.31 0.42 
N 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 
Notes: Results from an OLS model, where the dependent variable is the log of (1+) the yearly total amounts of public contracts received by each firm. 
ANR/ANRrank/ANRcore, PLRA and OPOS are dummy variables indicating political connection to the Colorado party (all/rank members/core 
members), the Liberal party and other opposition parties respectively. Trans and after are dummies for the transition and the following period respectively; 
in columns 1 to 3, the transition is 2008 and the following period covers 2009-2011; in columns 4 to 6, the transition is 2008-2009 and the following period 
covers 2010-2011. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm-level are in parentheses, * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3: Basic estimations of the impact of political connections on  







ANR*trans -0.178   
 (0.682)   
ANR*after -0.702   
 (0.568)   
ANRrank*trans  -0.124 -0.225 
  (0.740) (0.724) 
ANRrank*after  -0.666 -0.713 
  (0.599) (0.576) 
ANRcore*trans  -0.284 -0.344 
  (0.818) (0.807) 
ANRcore*after  -0.772 -0.768 
  (0.685) (0.654) 
PLRA*trans -1.844 -1.843 -2.215 
 (1.228) (1.228) (1.276)* 
PLRA*after -0.495 -0.495 -0.801 
 (0.918) (0.918) (0.887) 
OPOS*trans -2.769 -2.769 -2.746 
 (1.402)** (1.403)** (1.375)** 
OPOS*after -1.030 -1.030 -0.939 
 (1.305) (1.306) (1.211) 
Firms F.E. yes yes yes 
Product dummies yes yes yes 
Product shares   yes 
R2 0.10 0.10 0.13 
N 5,560 5,560 5,560 
Notes: Results from an OLS model, where the dependent variable is the log of (1+) 
the yearly total amounts of public contracts received by each firm through the 
exception modality. See notes to Table 1 for other aspects. Robust standard errors 




Table 4: The impact of political connections on the amount of contracts received  









Cat Fastest growing Fastest growing Biggest Biggest 
ANRrank*trans 1.751 1.400 3.335 2.921 
 (1.183) (1.057) (1.173)*** (1.132)** 
ANRrank*after 3.839 2.172 4.808 3.965 
 (1.049)*** (0.960)** (1.006)*** (0.996)*** 
ANRcore*trans 1.521 -0.028 4.104 2.139 
 (1.602) (1.355) (1.878)** (1.780) 
ANRcore*after 0.815 -0.412 3.452 0.988 
 (1.345) (1.158) (1.392)** (1.581) 
PLRA*trans 3.269 2.387 2.625 2.012 
 (1.898)* (1.748) (1.871) (1.858) 
PLRA*after 5.352 3.754 5.128 4.612 
 (1.578)*** (1.604)** (1.793)*** (1.757)*** 
OPOS*trans 5.094 -3.246 0.937 0.916 
 (5.110) (5.099) (4.871) (4.859) 
OPOS*after -0.653 -3.195 -3.292 -3.308 
 (1.870) (1.938)* (2.543) (2.538) 
ANRrank*trans*Cat -1.516 -1.190 -3.485 -3.066 
 (1.108) (0.984) (1.095)*** (1.056)*** 
ANRrank*after*Cat -5.511 -3.738 -6.558 -5.696 
 (0.988)*** (0.912)*** (0.942)*** (0.935)*** 
ANRcore*trans*Cat -3.849 -2.016 -6.661 -4.455 
 (1.605)** (1.385) (1.868)*** (1.774)** 
ANRcore*after*Cat -3.583 -2.225 -6.482 -3.629 
 (1.378)*** (1.232)* (1.407)*** (1.588)** 
PLRA*trans*Cat -0.311 1.160 0.630 1.608 
 (2.106) (2.009) (2.098) (2.083) 
PLRA*after*Cat -4.937 -2.737 -4.466 -3.799 
 (1.927)** (2.024) (2.079)** (2.068)* 
OPOS*trans*Cat -6.674 2.828 -2.199 -2.175 
 (5.253) (5.207) (5.030) (5.019) 
OPOS*after*Cat -0.033 3.115 3.037 3.056 
 (2.172) (2.263) (2.765) (2.761) 
Firms F.E. yes yes yes yes 
Product dummies yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.33 
N 5,560 5,560 5,560 5,560 
Notes: Results from an OLS model, where the dependent variable is the log of (1+) the yearly total amounts of public 
contracts received by each firm. In columns 1 and 2, Cat is a dummy variable for the biggest product categories in the 
2005-2007 sub-period (13 categories above the median in column 1, the 7 biggest in column 2). In columns 3 and 4, 
Cat is a dummy variable for the fastest growing product categories between the 2005-2007 and the 2009-2011 
sub-periods (13 categories above the median in column 3, the first 7 in column 4).See notes to Table 2 for other 




Table 5: First stage 
 (1) 
ln(institutions contracts to political firms) 
(2) 
ln(institutions contracts to political firms) 
 After : 2008-2011 After : 2009-2011 




Multiple subcontracting  units 2.13 2.68 
 (1.01)** (1.11)** 
Firms F.E. yes yes 
Year F.E. yes yes 
R2 0.13 0.14 
N 382 382 
F-stat overall 29.2*** 31.3*** 
F-stat excluded instruments 8.42*** 9.37*** 





Table 6: The impact of product categories’ growth on the number and concentration of suppliers 
 ln nb firms HHI Tender share Call share Licitacion share Exception share Direct purch. share Bank incidents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A – After :2008-11 
        
ln(pol. Contracts) 0.055 -0.009 -0.024 -0.037 0.013 0.013 0.010 -0.010 
 (0.018)*** (0.007) (0.012)* (0.013)*** (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)** 
 [0.28] [0.95] [0.49] [0.66] [0.15] [0.78] [0.13] [0.22] 
N 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 
Panel B – After :2009-11 
        
ln(pol. Contracts) 0.049 -0.008 -0.022 -0.032 0.010 0.009 0.013 -0.009 
 (0.017)*** (0.006) (0.011)* (0.012)*** (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)* (0.005)* 
 [0.13] [0.48] [0.95] [0.48] [0.33] [0.43] [0.31] [0.32] 
N 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 
Panel C – After :2006-07 
        
ln(pol. Contracts) 0.089 0.005 -0.051 -0.025 -0.026 0.037 0.014 0.015 
 (0.094) (0.03) (0.069) (0.042) (0.050) (0.050) (0.031) (0.018) 
 [0.93] [0.89] [0.66] [0.68] [0.34] [0.38] [0.68] [0.61] 
N 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
Panel D – large cat.         
ln(pol. Contracts) 0.072 -0.034 -0.021 -0.039 0.018 0.015 0.006 0.012 
 (0.024)*** (0.012)*** (0.015) (0.018)** (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006)*** 
 [0.20] [0.51] [0.26] [0.93] [0.15] [0.50] [0.02] [0.61] 
N 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 
Panel E – small cat.         
ln(pol. Contracts) -0.024 -0.042 0.039 0.064 -0.025 -0.022 -0.017 0.057 
 (0.060) (0.037) (0.042) (0.059) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.050) 
 [0.55] [0.82] [0.71] [0.66] [0.20] [0.12] [0.28] [0.86] 
N 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 
Institution FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Results from a 2SLS model, where the dependent variable is the yearly total number of active supplier firms per institution-year categories (columns 1), 
the concentration index of purchase across suppliers (HHI), the share of purchase made under specific procedures (columns 3 to 7), or the share of suppliers per 
institution-year categories being registered by the credit bureau as having had bank incidents in the past. All specifications include institution and year fixed 
effects, and control for the total institution-year level of spending. Standard errors clustered at the institution-year-level are in parentheses, * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01. F-statistics of the overidentification test are in square brackets. 
 
